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Abstract. Starting from the observation that rational closure has the undesirable
property of being an “all or nothing” mechanism, we here propose a multipref-
erential semantics, which enriches the preferential semantics underlying rational
closure in order to separately deal with the inheritance of different properties in
an ontology with exceptions. We provide a multipreference closure mechanism
which is sound with respect to the multipreference semantics.
1 Introduction
Reasoning with exceptions has been widely studied within non-monotonic reasoning
in Artificial Intelligence and in Description Logics (DLs). In particular, a lot of work
has been devoted to extending DLs with non-monotonig formalisms to allow reasoning
about prototypical properties of individuals [36,1,15,16,20,23,24,29,7,21,5,11,34,31,30,10,3].
In this paper we propose an extension of rational closure [32] for dealing with mul-
tiple preferences. One of the main difficulties of rational closure to deal with inheritance
of defeasible properties of concepts is the fact that one cannot reason property by prop-
erty: if a subclass of a class C is exceptional with respect to C for a given property,
it does not inherit any of the defeasible properties of C. This is the “all or nothing”
behavior of rational closure.
Consider the following version of the classic birds/penguins example:
Typical birds fly
Penguins are birds
Typical penguins do not fly
Typical birds have nice feather
By rational closure, penguins (being exceptional birds concerning the property of flying)
do not inherit any of the typical properties of birds.
On the contrary, one could expect penguins to inherit the property of having nice
feather, for which they are not exceptional. More generally, we would like to reason
independently on the inheritance of the properties of one concept by a more specific
one. This is what Lehmann calls “presumption of independence” [33]: even if typicality
is lost with respect to one property, we may still presume typicality with respect to
another, unless there is reason to the contrary.
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In this paper, we address this problem from the semantic point of view. Starting
from the preferential semantics underlying rational closure introduced by Lehmann and
Magidor [32] for propositional logics and extended to the description logic ALC in
[24], we consider a preferential semantics which allows to reason about typicality with
respect to different aspects. In this semantics, an individual can be more preferred than
another when considering one aspect (e.g. being a good student), while less preferred
when considering another aspect (e.g. being a good citizen). In this enriched preferential
semantics, different preference relations among domain elements are introduced, each
one describing the preference of an individual over another one with respect to a given
aspect/property. We show that this semantics is a strengthening of rational closure.
We provide a syntactic construction which is built over the rational closure and that
we call multipreference closure. The multipreference closure is proved to be a sound
construction for reasoning with multiple preferences, thus providing a sound approxi-
mation of the multipreference semantics. As we will see, this construction is strongly
related with the lexicographic closure, proposed by Lehmann [33] and extended to the
description logicALC by Casini and Straccia [12], but it exploits a different specificity
ordering, as it will become clear in Section 5.1, where we compare the two construc-
tions. Another approach related to ours is the logic of overriding DLN by Bonatti,
Faella, Petrova and Sauro [3], a nonmonotonic description logic which also allows rea-
soning independently about different defeasible properties. A difference with DLN is
thatDLN leads to the inconsistency of prototypical concepts (thus requiring a repair of
the KB) in those cases when a conflict among defaults cannot be solved by overriding.
In our approach, as in the lexicographic closure, such conflicts are silently removed
considering (skeptically) what holds in all the alternative bases (i.e., maximal consis-
tent sets of defeasible inclusions), while DLN computes a single base. We discuss the
relations between our approach andDLN in Section 5.1, where we also suggest that the
MP-closure construction could be further approximated by a construction which only
requires a polynomial number of entailment checks in ALC, following the approach in
[26].
We will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we recall the rational closure for descrip-
tion logics and its semantics. In Sections 3 and 3.1, we define the multipreference se-
mantics by introducing the notions of enriched and strongly enrichedmodels of a knowl-
edge base. In Section 5 we develop the multipreference closure construction, we show
that it is sound with respect to the semantics, and we compare it with the lexicographic
closure, with the logic of overridingDLN [3], and with related constructions. Sections
6 and 7 conclude the paper by assessing the contribution with respect to related work.
2 The Rational Closure and its Semantics
Let us briefly recall the logic ALC +TR which is at the basis of a rational closure con-
struction proposed in [24] for ALC. The intuitive idea of ALC + TR is to extend the
standard description logicALC with concepts of the formT(C), whose intuitive mean-
ing is thatT(C) selects the typical instances of a concept C, to distinguish between the
properties that hold for all instances of concept C (C ⊑ D), and those that only hold
for the typical instances (T(C) ⊑ D).
3LetNC be a set of concept names,NR a set of role names andNI a set of individual
names. The ALC + TR language is defined as follows: CR := A | ⊤ | ⊥ | ¬CR |
CR ⊓CR | CR ⊔ CR | ∀R.CR | ∃R.CR, and CL := CR | T(CR), where A ∈ NC and
R ∈ NR. A knowledge base (KB) is a pair K = (T ,A), where the TBox T contains
a finite set of concept inclusions CL ⊑ CR, and the ABox A contains a finite set of
assertions of the form CR(a) and aRb, where a, b ∈ NI are individual names. In the
following we will call non-extended concepts the concepts CR of the language, which
do not contain the T operator.
The semantics of ALC + TR is defined in terms of ranked models similar to those
introduced in [32]: ordinary models of ALC are equipped with a preference relation
< on the domain, whose intuitive meaning is to compare the “typicality” of domain
elements: x < y means that x is more typical than y. Typical members of a concept C,
instances of T(C), are the members x of C that are minimal with respect to < (such
that there is no other member of C more typical than x). In rational models< is further
assumed to be modular (i.e., for all x, y, z ∈ ∆, if x < y then either x < z or z < y)
and well-founded 3 (i.e., there is no infinite <-descending chain, so that, if S 6= ∅, also
min<(S) 6= ∅). Ranked models characterizeALC +TR.
Definition 1 (Semantics ofALC+TR [24]). A modelM ofALC+TR is any structure
〈∆,<, I〉 where: ∆ is the domain; < is an irreflexive, transitive, modular and well-
founded relation over ∆. I is an interpretation function that maps each concept name
C ∈ RC to C
I ⊆ ∆, each role name R ∈ NR to R
I ⊆ ∆I ×∆I and each individual
name a ∈ NI to aI ∈ ∆. For concepts of ALC, CI is defined in the usual way. For the
T operator, we have (T(C))I = min<(C
I).
As shown in [24], the logic ALC + TR enjoys the finite model property and finite
ALC+TR models can be equivalently defined by postulating the existence of a function
kM : ∆ 7−→ N, where kM assigns a finite rank to each world: the rank kM of a domain
element x ∈ ∆ is the length of the longest chain x0 < · · · < x from x to a minimal
x0 (s. t. there is no x
′ with x′ < x0). The rank kM(CR) of a concept CR in M is
i = min{kM(x) : x ∈ CIR}.
A model M satisfies a knowledge base K = (T ,A) if it satisfies its TBox (and
for all inclusions C ⊑ D ∈ T , it CI ⊆ DI holds), and its ABox (for all C(a) ∈ A,
aI ∈ CI and, for all aRb ∈ A, (aI , bI) ∈ RI ). A query F (either an assertion CL(a) or
an inclusion relation CL ⊑ CR) is logically (rationally) entailed by a knowledge base
K (K |=ALC+TR F ) if F holds in all models satisfyingK .
Although the typicality operatorT itself is nonmonotonic (i.e.T(C) ⊑ D does not
imply T(C ⊓ E) ⊑ D), the logic ALC + TR is monotonic: what is logically entailed
byK is still entailed by anyK ′ withK ⊆ K ′.
In [27,24] a non monotonic construction of rational closure has been defined for
ALC +TR, extending the notion of rational closure proposed in the propositional con-
text by Lehmann and Magidor [32]. The definition is based on the notion of exception-
ality. Roughly speaking T(C) ⊑ D holds (is included in the rational closure) of K if
C (indeed, C ⊓D) is less exceptional than C ⊓ ¬D. We briefly recall this construction
3 Since ALC + TR has the finite model property, this is equivalent to having the Smoothness
Condition, as shown in [24]. We choose this formulation because it is simpler.
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and we refer to [27,24] for full details. Here we only consider rational closure of TBox,
defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Exceptionality of concepts and inclusions). Let E be a TBox and C a
concept. C is said to be exceptional for E if and only if E |=ALC+TR T(⊤) ⊑ ¬C.
A T-inclusion T(C) ⊑ D is exceptional for E if C is exceptional for E. The set of
T-inclusions of E which are exceptional for E will be denoted as E(E).
Given a ALC +TR TBox, it is possible to define a sequence of non increasing subsets
of a TBox T ordered according to the exceptionality of the elements E0 ⊇ E1, E1 ⊇
E2, . . . by letting E0 = T and, for i > 0, Ei = E(Ei−1) ∪ {C ⊑ D ∈ TBox s.t. T
does not occurr in C}. Observe that, being KB finite, there is an n ≥ 0 such that, for
all m > n,Em = En or Em = ∅. A concept C has rank i (denoted rank(C) = i) for
TBox, iff i is the least natural number for which C is not exceptional for Ei. If C is
exceptional for all Ei then rank(C) =∞ (C has no rank).
Rational closure builds on this notion of exceptionality:
Definition 3 (Rational closure of TBox). LetK = (T ,A) be anALC+TR knowledge
base. The rational closure, TBox , of the TBox T , is defined as:
TBox={T(C) ⊑ D | either rank(C) < rank(C ⊓ ¬D) or rank(C) =∞} ∪
{C ⊑ D | KB |=ALC+TR C ⊑ D}, where C andD are ALC concepts.
Agood property of rational closure is that, forALC, deciding if an inclusionT(C) ⊑
D belongs to the rational closure of TBox is a problem in EXPTIME [24].
In [24] it is shown that the semantics corresponding to rational closure can be given
in terms of minimal canonical ALC + TR models. With respect to standard ALC +
TR models, in such models the rank of each domain element is as low as possible
(each domain element is assumed to be as typical as possible). This is expressed by the
following definition.
Definition 4 (Minimal models of K (with respect to TBox)). GivenM =〈∆,<, I〉
andM′ = 〈∆′, <′, I ′〉 , we say thatM is preferred to M′ (M ≺ M′) if: ∆ = ∆′,
CI = CI
′
for all (non-extended) concepts C, for all x ∈ ∆, it holds that kM(x) ≤
kM′(x) whereas there exists y ∈ ∆ such that kM(y) < kM′(y).
Given a knowledge base K = (T ,A), we say that M is a minimal model of K
(with respect to TBox) if it is a model satisfyingK and there is noM′ model satisfying
K such thatM′ <M.
Furthermore, the models corresponding to rational closure are canonical. This property,
expressed by the following definition, is needed when reasoning about the (relative)
rank of the concepts: it is important to have them all represented.
Definition 5 (Canonical model). Given K = (T ,A), a modelM =〈∆,<, I〉 satisfy-
ingK is canonical if for each set of concepts {C1, C2, . . . , Cn}consistent withK , there
exists (at least) a domain element x ∈ ∆ such that x ∈ (C1 ⊓C2 ⊓ · · · ⊓Cn)I .
Definition 6 (Minimal canonical models (with respect to TBox)). M is a minimal
canonical model ofK , if it is a canonical model ofK and it is minimal with respect <
(see Definition 4) among the canonical models ofK .
5The correspondence between minimal canonical models and rational closure is es-
tablished by the following key theorem.
Theorem 1 ([24]). Let K = (T ,A) be a knowledge base and C ⊑ D a query. Let
TBox be the rational closure of K w.r.t. TBox. We have that C ⊑ D ∈ TBox if and
only if C ⊑ D holds in all minimal canonical models ofK with respect to TBox.
3 Enriched Preferential Semantics
The main weakness of rational closure, despite its power and its nice computational
properties, is that it is an all-or-nothing mechanism that does not allow to separately
reason on single aspects. As mentioned in the introduction, to overcome this difficulty,
here we consider models with several preference relations, one for each aspect we want
to reason about. We assume an aspect can be any concept occurring in K on the right
end side of some typicality inclusion T(C) ⊑ A: we call LA the set of these aspects.
Observe that A may be non-atomic; it is an arbitrary non-extended concept. For each
aspect A ∈ LA, the relation<A expresses the preference for aspect A being true:<Fly
expresses the preference for flying, so if it holds that T(Bird) ⊑ Fly, birds that do fly
will be preferred to birds that do not fly, with respect to aspect fly, i.e. with respect to
<Fly .
Notice that the preferences with respect to aspects might be conflicting. It can be
that, for instance, x is preferred to y for aspect Ai (x <Ai y), whereas y is preferred to
x for aspectAj (y <Aj x). In the example of birds, we can have that x <Fly y, whereas
y <HasNiceFeather x.
With this semantic richness we aim to obtain a strengthening of rational closure in
which typicality with respect to every aspect is maximized. Since we want to compare
our approach to rational closure, we keep the language the same as in ALC + TR.
In particular, we only include a single typicality operator T. However, the semantic
richness could motivate the introduction of several typicality operatorsTA1 . . .TAn by
which one could explicitly refer within the language to the typicality w.r.t. aspect A1,
or A2, and so on. We leave this extension for future work.
Let us now enrich the definition of an ALC + TR model given above (Definition
1) by taking into account preferences with respect to the aspects, as well as a global
preference relation <.
Definition 7 (Enriched rational interpretation). An enriched rational interpretation
is a structure M = 〈∆,<A1 , . . . , <An , <, I〉, where ∆ and I are a domain and an
interpretation function (as in Definition 1), <A1 , . . . , <An , < are irreflexive, transitive,
modular and well-founded preference relations over ∆. Furthermore, < satisfies the
condition:
(a) If there is someAi such that x <Ai y, and there is noAj such that y <Aj x,
then x < y.
Last, we let: min<(S) = {x ∈ S s.t. there is no x1 ∈ S s.t. x1 < x} and
(T(C))I = min<(C
I).
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In the semantics above the global preference relation < is related to the various prefer-
ence relations <Ai , relative to single aspects Ai, that we call indexed preference rela-
tions. Given condition (a), x < y holds when x is preferred to y for a single aspect Ai,
and there is no aspectAj for which y is preferred to x. This allows to define preferences
among elements having the same rank in the minimal canonical models of the rational
closure. As it will become clear, this brings us towards the direction of a refinement of
the semantics of rational closure.
Let min<Ai (S) = {x ∈ S s.t. there is no x1 ∈ S s.t. x1 <Ai x}. In order to be a
model ofK , an enriched rational model must satisfy the following conditions.
Definition 8 (Enriched rational models of K). Given a knowledge base K = (T ,A),
an enriched rational model (or enriched model) for K is an enriched interpretation
M = 〈∆,<A1 , . . . , <An , <, I〉 ofK which satisfies T and A, where:
−M satisfies the TBox T if
(1) for all strict inclusions C ⊑ D ∈ T (where T does not occur in C), CI ⊆ DI ;
(2) for all typicality inclusionsT(C) ⊑ Ai ∈ T ,min<(C
I) ⊆ Ai
I ;
(3) for all typicality inclusionsT(C) ⊑ Ai ∈ T ,min<Ai (C
I) ⊆ Ai
I .
− M satisfies the ABox A if: (i) for all C(a) ∈ A, aI ∈ CI ; (ii) for all aRb ∈ A,
(aI , bI) ∈ RI .
By condition (3), the domain elements satisfying all the defeasible inclusions concern-
ing aspect Ai will be preferred with respect to <Ai to those falsifying some of them.
We call ALCRTE the description logic extending ALC with typicality under the
enriched semantics. Logical entailment in ALCRTE is defined as usual: a query F
(with form CL(a) or CL ⊑ CR) is logically entailed byK (writtenK |=ALCRTE F ) if
F holds in all the enriched models ofK .
The following example shows that, at least in some cases, condition (a) allows to
establish the expected preference between individuals.
Example 1. Let T = {Penguin ⊑ Bird, T(Bird) ⊑ HasNiceFeather, T(Bird) ⊑
F ly, T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬F ly}. LA = {HasNiceFeather, F ly,¬F ly,Bird, Penguin}. We
consider an ALCRTE model M of K , that we don’t fully describe but which we
only use to observe the behavior of two Penguins x, y with respect to the properties of
(not) flying and having nice feather. In particular, let us consider the three preference
relations: <,<Fly, <¬Fly, <HasNiceFeather .
Suppose x <HasNiceFeather y (because x, as all typical birds, has a nice feather
whereas y does not) and there is no other aspect Ai such that y <Ai x, and in particular
it does neither hold that y <¬Fly x (because for instance, as all typical penguins, both
x and y do not fly), nor that y <Fly x. In this case, obviously it holds that x < y, since
condition (a) in Definition 7 is satisfied.
However, the enriched semantics does not provide a refinement of the rational clo-
sure.
Example 2. Let us compare the domain element x ∈ (Bird ⊓ Penguin ⊓ ¬Fly ⊓
¬HasNiceFeather)I in a modelM with a domain element y ∈ (Bird⊓Penguin⊓
7Fly ⊓ HasNiceFeather)I . We have that y <Fly x, y <HasNiceFeather x and
x <¬Fly y. Hence, condition (a) cannot help to conclude anything about the global
relation< concerning x and y (and, in particular, we cannot conclude x < y). However,
in all the models of the rational closure, we would prefer x to y.
Observe that, in this last example, x violates the defeasible properties of Birds of flying
and having a nice feather, while y violates the more specific defeasible property of
Penguin of not flying.
3.1 S-Enriched models
In order to deal with cases as Example 2 and in order to obtain a strengthening of ratio-
nal closure, we strengthen the definition of enrichedmodel, by introducing an additional
condition beside condition (a). In particular, we define a subset of enriched models, that
we call strongly enriched (S-enriched) models, as they enforce the respect for “speci-
ficity” also in cases when enriched models do not. In addition to the constraints linking
the global preference relation < to the indexed preference relations <A1 · · · <An ,
which leads to preferring (with respect to the global <) the individuals that are mini-
mal with respect to the aspects Ai, we add a further constraint which leads to prefer
the individuals violating defeasible properties of less specific concepts with respect to
individuals violating defeasible properties of more specific concepts. It turns out that
this leads to a stronger semantics, which is able to capture wanted inferences, such as
those in Example 2, and which provides a strengthening of rational closure semantics
in Section 2.
In order to define S-enriched models of a knowledge base K , we strengthen the
definition of satisfiability of a TBox as follows.
Definition 9 (S-enriched rationalmodels of K).Given a knowledge baseK = (T ,A),
an enriched interpretation M = 〈∆,<A1 , . . . , <An , <, I〉 is an S-enriched rational
model forK ifM satisfies the TBox T and the ABox A, where:
M satisfies T if
(1) for all strict inclusions C ⊑ D ∈ T (i.e.,T does not occur in C), CI ⊆ DI ;
(2) for all typicality inclusionsT(C) ⊑ Ai ∈ T ,min<(CI) ⊆ Ai
I ;
(3) for all typicality inclusionsT(C) ⊑ Ai ∈ T ,min<Ai (C
I) ⊆ Ai
I .
(4) If there is T(Ci) ⊑ Ai ∈ T s.t. x <Ai y and y ∈ C
I
i and,
for all T(Cj) ⊑ Aj ∈ T s.t. y <Aj x and x ∈ C
I
j , there is T(Ck) ⊑ Ak ∈ T s.t.
x <Ak y, y ∈ C
I
k , and kM(Cj) < kM(Ck),
then x < y.
M satisfies A if: (i) for all C(a) ∈ A, aI ∈ CI , (ii) for all aRb ∈ A, (aI , bI) ∈ RI .
We call ALCRTS the logic based on the semantics of S-enriched models and we de-
fine logical entailment in ALCRTS as usual: a query F is logically entailed by K in
ALCRTS (writtenK |=ALCRTS F ) if F holds in all the S-enriched models ofK .
We call condition (4) “specificity condition”, as it captures the idea that, in case
two individuals are preferred one another with respect to different aspects, preference
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(with respect to the global preference relation <) should be given to the individual that
falsifies typical properties of concepts with lower ranks. Violating a default property
of a less specific concept Cj is less serious than violating a default property of a more
specific concept Ck .
The idea is that, in S-enriched models,< provides a strengthening of the preference
relation in ranked models of rational closure. In particular, further preferences are de-
termined among the elements having the same rank in the models of rational closure,
both by exploiting the preference relations <Ai with respect to single aspects (condi-
tion (a)), and by exploiting the specificity criterium (condition (4)). Observe that (4) is
only a sufficient condition for x < y. It is not required to be a necessary condition, and
additional pairs x′ < y′ might be needed for < to satisfy modularity.
The above semantics allows us to model a form of inheritance in which the defea-
sible properties of concepts (classes) are inherited by more specific concepts, unless
they are overridden by the properties of more specific ones. Also, the overriding of
some defeasible property of a concept should not cause the overriding of all the defea-
sible properties of that concept, and the inheritance of a more specific property should
win over the inheritance of a less specific one. These criteria are incorporated among
the desirable principles considered by Lehmann in [33] namely, the “presumption of
typicality”, the “presumption of independence”, “priority to typicality” and “respect
of specificity”, which underly the lexicographic closure definition. Similar criteria are
also at the basis of the nonmonotonic description logic DLN [3], whose definition ex-
plicitly uses the notion of overriding. We will provide a detailed comparison with the
lexicographic closure and with DLN in Section 5.1.
With reference to Example 2, we can see that, with this notion of S-enriched seman-
tics, we are able to give preference to a domain element x which is a penguin that does
not fly and has not nice feathers (thus violating the defeasible property T(Bird) ⊑
HasNiceFeather of birds) with respect to an element y corresponding to penguin
which has not nice feathers but flies, violating themore specific propertyT(Penguin) ⊑
¬Fly of penguins.
For ALCRTS we can prove the following theorem, showing the relations between
ALCRTS and ALC + TR (the extension of ALC with the typicality operator defined
in Section 2). It is a an immediate consequence of the fact that a S-enriched model is a
ALC +TR model.
Theorem 2. If K |=ALC+TR F then also K |=ALCRTS F . If T does not occur in F
the other direction also holds: IfK |=ALCRTS F then alsoK |=ALC+TR F .
The theorem is a an immediate consequence of the fact that a S-enriched model is a
ALC+TR model. By contraposition, from the hypothesis thatK 6|=ALCRTS F , there is
an S-enriched modelM satisfyingK and falsifying F . SinceM is also an ALC +TR
model of K , it follows that K 6|=ALC+TR F . For the second part, observe that, by
contraposition, if K 6|=ALC+TR F , then there is an ALC + TR modelM = 〈∆,<, I〉
ofK falsifying F . We can define an S-enriched model ofK ,M′ = 〈∆,<A1 , . . . , <An
, <, I〉, by letting, for all i = 1, . . . , n, <Ai=<. It is easy to see that M
′ satisfies
condition (a) in Definition 7 as well as conditions (1)-(4) in Definition 9 and, hence, it
is an S-enriched model ofK which falsifies F .
94 Minimal S-enriched models and their relation with rational
closure
As in the semantic characterization of the rational closure in Section 2, we restrict our
consideration to minimal canonical models of the KB. We define minimal S-enriched
models by first minimizing the rank of each domain element with respect to the in-
dexed preference relations <Ai’s, and then by minimizing the rank of the elements
with respect to the global preference relation <. Let kM,Ai(x) be the rank of a domain
element x of the modelM with respect to the indexed relation <Ai .
Definition 10 (Minimal S-enriched models of K (with respect to TBox)). Given
two S-enriched modelsM =〈∆,<A1 , . . . , <An , <, I〉 andM
′ = 〈∆′, <′A1 , . . . , <
′
An
, <′, I ′〉,
– M′ is preferred to M w.r.t. the aspects (and write M′ ≺Aspects M) if ∆ = ∆′,
I = I ′, and:
• for all x ∈ ∆, kM′,Ai(x) ≤ kM,Ai(x);
• for some y ∈ ∆, kM′,Ai(y) < kM,Ai(y)
– M′ is preferred toMw.r.t. the global preference relation< (and writeM′ ≺global
M) if ∆ = ∆′, I = I ′, and
• for all x ∈ ∆, kM′(x) ≤ kM(x);
• for some y ∈ ∆ , kM′(y) < kM(y)
We combine the two preference relations in the lexicographic order: We say thatM′
is preferred toM (and writeM′ ≺M) if ∆ = ∆′, I = I ′, and
– eitherM′ ≺Aspects M or
– M 6≺Aspects M′ andM′ ≺global M.
Given a knowledge base K = 〈T ,A〉, we say that M is a minimal S-enriched
model of K (with respect to TBox) if it is an S-enriched model of K and there is no
modelM′ satisfying K such thatM′ ≺M.
As the definition of the global preference < depends on the indexed preferences Ai,
we first minimize with respects to the aspects Ai and, then, with respect to the global
preference<.
In minimal models, each preference relation <Ai ranks the domain elements into
two levels: the domain elements x satisfying all the defeasible inclusion concerning
aspect Ai (having rank kM,Ai(x) = 0), and the domain elements y falsifying some
defeasible inclusion concerning aspect Ai (having rank kM,Ai(y) > 0). This is similar
to the interpretation given by Lehmann to single defaults in [33]).
Let us restrict our attention to minimal S-enriched models which are canonical.
Definition 11 (Minimal canonical S-enriched models of K). A minimal canonical
S-enriched model M of K is an S-enriched model of K , which is minimal (with re-
spect to Definition 10) and it is canonical, i.e., for each set of (non-extended) concepts
{C1, C2, . . . , Cn} s.t. K 6|=ALCRTS C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ · · · ⊓ Cn ⊑ ⊥, there exists (at least) a
domain element x such that x ∈ (C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ · · · ⊓ Cn)I .
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In the following we will write: K|=min
ALCRTS
C ⊑ D to mean that C ⊑ D holds in
all minimal canonical S-enriched models ofK .
The following example shows that this semantics allows us to correctly deal with
the wanted inferences. and, in particular, that inheritance of defeasible properties, when
not overridden for more specific concepts, applies to concepts of all ranks.
Example 3. Consider a knowledge base K=(T ,A), where A = ∅ and T contains the
following inclusions:
T(Bird) ⊑ Fly
Penguin ⊑ Bird
T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly
T(Penguin) ⊑ BlackFeather
BabyPenguin ⊑ Penguin
T(BabyPenguin) ⊑ ¬BlackFeather .
As we have seen from Example 1, the defeasible property of birds having a nice feather
is inherited by typical penguins, even though penguins are exceptional birds regarding
flying. Here, we also expect that typical baby penguins inherit the defeasible property
of penguins that they do not fly (by presumption of independence [33]), although the
defeasible property BlackFeather is instead overridden for typical baby penguins.
Consider two domain elements z and w which are both baby penguins and have a
non black feather. Suppose that z flies and w doesn’t. Then z violates the defeasible
property that penguins typically do not fly, while w violates the defeasible property
that birds typically fly. As z <Fly w and w <¬Fly z, condition (a) neither allows to
conclude w < z, nor z < w. However, z violates a more specific defeasible property
than w and, hence, by the specificity condition (4) of S-enriched models in Definition
9, we can conclude that w < z holds. Indeed, the S-enriched minimal model semantics
allows us to conclude thatT(BabyPenguin) ⊑ ¬Fly, as wanted.
We have developed the semantics above in order to overcome a weakness of ratio-
nal closure, namely its all-or-nothing character. In order to show that the semantics hits
the point, we prove that the semantics of minimal canonical S-enriched models is a re-
finement of the semantics of rational closure, i.e. that minimal entailment in ALCRTS
strengthens reasoning under the rational closure.
Theorem 3. Let K = (TBox,ABox) be a knowledge base. If C ⊑ D ∈ TBox then
K|=min
ALCRTS
C ⊑ D.
Proof. By contraposition suppose that K 6|=min
ALCRTS
C ⊑ D. Then there is a minimal
canonical S-enriched modelM = 〈∆,<A1 , . . . , <An , <, I〉 of K and an y ∈ C
I such
that y 6∈ DI . All sets of concepts consistent withK w.r.t.ALCRTS are also consistent
with K with respect to ALC + TR, and viceversa (by Theorem 2). By definition of
canonical,M′ = 〈∆,<, I〉 is a canonicalALC +TR model ofK according to Defini-
tion 1 in Section 2. Also, there must be a minimal canonical model ofK obtained from
M′ by possibly lowering the ranks of domain elements. LetMRC = 〈∆,<RC , I〉 be
such a model.
If C does not contain the T operator, we are done: in MRC , as in M, there is
y ∈ CI such that y 6∈ DI , hence C ⊑ D does not hold inMRC , and C ⊑ D 6∈ TBox.
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If T occurs in C, and C = T(C′), we still need to show that also in MRC , as in M,
y ∈ (T(C))I , i.e. y ∈ min<RC(C
′I). We prove this by showing that for all x, y ∈ ∆
if x <RC y inMRC , then also x < y inM. The proof is by induction on kMRC (x).
For the base case, let kMRC (x) = 0 and kMRC (y) > 0. Since x does not violate
any inclusion, also in M (by minimality of M) kM(x) = 0. This cannot hold for y,
for which kM(y) > 0 (otherwiseM would violate K , against the hypothesis). Hence
x < y holds inM.
For the inductive case, let kMRC (x) = i < kMRC (y), i.e. x <RC y. As x <RC y
in MRC and the rank of x in MRC is i, there must be a T(Bi) ⊑ Ai ∈ Ei − Ei+1
such that x ∈ (¬Bi ⊔ Ai)I whereas y ∈ (Bi ⊓ ¬Ai)I inMRC , so that x <Ai y holds
in the minimal S-enriched modelM.
Before we proceed let us notice that by definition of Ei in Section 2, as well
as by what stated just above on the relation between rank of a concept and kMRC ,
kMRC (Bi) = kMRC (x). We will use this fact below. We show that, for any inclusion
T(Bl) ⊑ Al ∈ K such that y <Al x and x ∈ Bl, it holds that kM(Bl) < kM(Bi), so
that, by (4), x < y.
Let T(Bl) ⊑ Al ∈ K such that y <Al x and x ∈ Bl. AsM is a minimal model,
T(Bl) ⊑ Al ∈ K is violated by x, i.e. x ∈ (Bl ⊓ ¬Al)I . Since MRC satisfies K , x
cannot be a typical Bl-element and there must be x
′ <RC x inMRC with x′ ∈ (Bl)I .
As kMRC (x
′) < i, by inductive hypothesis, x′ < x in M. As x′ ∈ Bl
I , kM(Bl) ≤
kM(x
′). Since it can be shown that kM(x
′) < kM(Bi), kM(Bl) < kM(Bi), and by
condition (4), it holds that x < y inM.
With these facts, since y ∈ min<(C′
I
) holds in M, also y ∈ min<RC(C
′I) in
MRC , henceT(C′) ⊑ D does not hold inMRC , andC ⊑ D = T(C′) ⊑ D 6∈ TBox.
The theorem follows by contraposition. ⊓⊔
Observe that, in the proof of Theorem 3, we have not used condition (a) of Definition
8. Indeed, we can show that the specificity condition (4) in minimal S-enriched models
(Definition 9) subsumes condition (a), dealing with multiple aspects. Let us consider a
simplified notion of S-enriched model in which condition (a) is omitted.
Proposition 1. LetM = 〈∆,<A1 , . . . , <An , <, I〉 be a minimal simplified S-enriched
model ofK . We can show that if condition (4) holds, then condition (a) holds as well.
Proof. To see that condition (4) implies condition (a), suppose that the precondition of
(a) holds, i.e., that there is some Ai such that x <Ai y inM, and there is no Aj such
that y <Aj x. We show that x < y follows using condition (4).
As x <Ai y and the modelM is minimal, in particular, it is minimal with respect
to the aspects and there must be a defeasible inclusion T(C) ⊑ Ai ∈ K s.t. x satisfies
it (x ∈ (¬C ⊔ Ai)
I ), and y violates it (y ∈ (C ⊓ ¬Ai)
I ). Additionally, for all Aj
(i 6= j), y 6<Aj x, that is, all the defeasible inclusions satisfied by y are also satisfied by
x. Therefore, the antecedent of condition (4), the “If part”, holds as there is no inclusion
which is falsified by x and satisfied by y. Hence, by condition (4), x < y follows. ⊓⊔
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5 The multipreference-closure
As the minimal S-enriched semantics is a strengthening of the rational closure seman-
tics, in this section we build on the rational closure to define a new notion of closure,
that we call the multipreference-closure (MP-closure, for short). We show that the MP-
closure provides a sound approximation of the minimal S-enriched semantics: reason-
ing in theMP-closurewill allow to derive sound conclusionswith respect to the minimal
canonical S-enrichedmodels semantics. The MP-closure can be regarded as a variant of
the lexicographic closure [33] and we compare the MP-closure with the lexicographic
closure and with the nonmonotonic description logic DLN [3].
According to condition (4) in Definition 9, the rank of concepts in a S-enriched
model is used to determine the specificity of typicality inclusions and, thus, to deter-
mine the preference relation < among domain elements. As the ranking of concepts
in the rational closure approximates the ranking of concepts in minimal canonical S-
enriched models of the KB, it can be used for determining the specificity of typicality
inclusions in a closure thus providing a sound approximation of minimal entailment in
the S-enriched semantics.
In particular, if rank(B) is the rank of a conceptB in the rational closure, the most
preferred B-elements in minimal canonical S-enriched models must be among the B-
elements with rank rank(B). According to condition (4) we prefer a B-element x with
rank rank(B) to another one y with the same rank, if for all the defeasible inclusions
falsified by x and not by y there is a more specific defeasible inclusion falsified by
y and not by x. In essence, we need to identify those B-elements with rank rank(B)
which satisfy a maximal subset of defeasible inclusions, containing inclusions being as
specific as possible (something which is very similar to what the lexicographic closure
construction [33] does).
In the following, we provide a construction (the MP-closure) to check the entail-
ment of a subsumption query T(B) ⊑ D from a TBox and we show that the logical
consequences under the MP-closure are sound with respect to the S-enriched seman-
tics. Given a TBox T , we compute the sequence of TBoxes E0, E1, . . . , En according
to the rational closure construction in Section 2. We let δ(Ei) be the set of typical-
ity inclusions contained in Ei (i.e. those defeasible inclusions with rank ≥ i) and let
Di =, δ(Ei) − δ(Ei+1) be the set of typicality inclusions with rank i. Observe that
δ(E0) = δ(T ). Given a set S of typicality inclusions, we let: Si = S ∩Di, for all ranks
i = 0, . . . , n in the rational closure, thus defining a partition of the set S according
to the rank. We introduce a preference relation among sets of typicality inclusions as
follows: S′ ≺ S (S′ is preferred to S) if and only if there is an h such that, Sh ⊂ S′h
and, for all j > h, S′j = Sj . The meaning of S
′ ≺ S is that, considering the highest
rank h in which S and S′ do not contain the same defeasible inclusions, S′ contains
more defeasible inclusions in Dh than S.
Definition 12. Let B be a concept such that rank(B) = k and let S ⊆ δ(TBox).
S ∪ Ek is a maximal set of defeasible inclusions compatible with B in K if:
– Ek 6|=ALC+TR T(⊤) ∩ S˜ ⊑ ¬B
– and there is no S′ ⊆ δ(TBox) such that Ek 6|=ALC+TR T(⊤) ∩ S˜
′ ⊑ ¬B and
S′ ≺ S (S′ is preferred to S).
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where S˜ is the materialization of S, i.e., S˜ = ⊓{(¬C ⊔D) | T(C) ⊑ D ∈ S}.
Informally, S is a maximal set of defeasible inclusions compatible with B and Ek if
there is no set S′ which is consistent with Ek and B and is preferred to S since it
contains more specific defeasible inclusions. The construction is similar to that of the
lexicographic closure [33,12], although, in this case, the comparison of the sets of de-
feasible inclusions with the same rank (i.e. of Si and S
′
i) is based on subset inclusion
rather than on the size of the sets, as in the lexicographic closure.
To check if a subsumption T(B) ⊑ D is derivable from the MP-closure of TBox
we have to consider all the maximal sets of defeasible inclusions S that are compatible
with B.
Definition 13. Let T(B) ⊑ D be a query and let k = rank(B) be the rank of concept
B in the rational closure. T(B) ⊑ D follows from the MP-closure of TBox if for all
the maximal sets of defeasible inclusions S that are compatible with B inK , we have:
Ek |=ALC+TR T(⊤) ⊓ S˜ ⊑ (¬B ⊔D)
Verifyingwhether a queryT(B) ⊑ D is derivable from theMP-closure of the TBox
in the worst case requires to consider an exponential number (in the number of typicality
inclusions in K) of maximal subsets S of defeasible inclusions compatible with B and
Ek. As entailment in ALC + TR can be computed in EXPTIME [24], this complexity
is still in EXPTIME. However, in practice, it is clearly less effective than computing
subsumption in the rational closure of TBox, which only requires a polynomial number
of calls to entailment checks inALC+TR, which can be computed by a linear encoding
of an ALC +TR KB into ALC [18].
Let us consider again the knowledge base in Example 1.
Example 4. Let K=(T,A), where T = {Penguin ⊑ Bird,T(Bird) ⊑ HasNice-
Feather, T(Bird) ⊑ Fly, T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly} and A = ∅. We want to check
whether the query:T(Penguin) ⊑ HasNiceFeather holds in all minimal canonical
MP models of the TBox. From the rational closure of TBox, we have: rank(Bird) = 0,
rank(Penguin) = 1 and
E0 = {Penguin ⊑ Bird, T(Bird) ⊑ Fly,T(Bird) ⊑ HasNiceFeather}
E1 = {Penguin ⊑ Bird, T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly}
Let S = { T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly, T(Bird) ⊑ HasNiceFeather}. We have:
E1 6|=ALC+TR T(⊤) ⊓ S˜ ⊑ ¬Penguin
and S is the unique maximal set of defeasible inclusions compatible with Penguin. As
it holds thatE1 |= T(⊤)∩ S˜ ⊑ (¬ Penguin⊔HasNiceFeather), thenT(Penguin)
⊑ HasNiceFeather is derivable from the MP-closure of the TBox, which is in agree-
ment with the fact that, in all the minimal S-enriched canonical models of the TBox, the
typical penguins have a nice feather. 
It is easy to see that, in the general case, there may be more then one maximal set
of typicality inclusions compatible with a given concept B. Coinsider the following
example:
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Example 5. Let K=(TBox,ABox), where TBox = {Penguin ⊑ Bird, Penguin ⊓
A ⊓ H ⊑ ⊥, A ⊑ C, H ⊑ C, T(Bird) ⊑ Fly, T(Bird) ⊑ H, T(Bird) ⊑
A, T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly}.
Observe that typical birds have both the properties H and A. However, by the sec-
ond inclusion in TBox, a typical penguin cannot inherit both property A and property
H . It can inherit just one of them and, semantically, we prefer penguins having either
property A or property H to the penguins that neither have property A nor have prop-
erty H . Hence, we can conclude that typical penguins have the property C in all the
minimal S-enriched canonical models of the KB. Let TBoxStrict be the strict inclusion
in the TBox.
Given the queryT(Penguin) ⊑ C, as before rank(Bird) = 0, rank(Penguin) =
1 and E1 = TBoxStrict ∪ {T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly}. We have two maximal sets of
defeasible inclusions compatible with the concept Penguin:
S = {T(Bird) ⊑ H, T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly} and
S′ = {T(Bird) ⊑ A, T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly},
The subsumption T(Penguin) ⊑ C is derivable from the MP-closure of TBox (al-
though neither T(Penguin) ⊑ A nor T(Penguin) ⊑ H can be derived from the
MP-closure of TBox), as we have:
E1 |= T(⊤) ⊓ S˜ ⊑ (¬ Penguin ⊔C) and
E1 |= T(⊤) ⊓ S˜′ ⊑ (¬ Penguin⊔ C).
S characterizes the typical penguins having the default property H of birds, while S′
characterizes the typical penguins having the default property A of birds. Observe that
T(Penguin) ⊑ C is not derivable from the rational closure for ALC recalled in Sec-
tion 3, as the rational closure is weaker then the MP-closure.
We show the soundness of the MP-closure construction by proving that the typi-
cality inclusions which follow from the MP-closure of a TBox hold in all the minimal
canonical S-enriched models of the TBox.
Proposition 2. If T(B) ⊑ D follows from the MP-closure of K , then K |=min
ALCRTS
T(B) ⊑ D.
Proof. By contraposition.
Let K be a knowledge base and B a concept with rank(B) = k in the rational
closure. Assume that for some minimal canonical S-enriched model M = 〈∆,<A1
, . . . , <An , <, I〉 ofK there is an element x ∈ ∆ such that x ∈ min<(B
I) and x 6∈ DI .
We prove that there is a maximal set of defeasible inclusions S compatible with B in
K , such that
Ek 6|=ALC+TR T(⊤) ⊓ S˜ ⊑ (¬B ⊔D)
i.e., T(B) ⊑ D does not follow from the MP-closure ofK .
Let us define S as the set of all the defeasible inclusions in TBox which are satisfied
by x in M, i.e. S = {T(C) ⊑ E ∈ TBox | x ∈ (¬C ⊔ E)I}. We show that
Ek 6|=ALC+TR T(⊤) ⊓ S˜ ⊑ (¬B ⊔D).
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By Theorem 3, M is the refinement of a minimal canonical rational model of K
MRC = 〈∆,<rc, I〉. It is easy to see thatMRC is a minimal canonical model of the
rational closure of K . By a property ofMRC (Proposition 12 in [24]),MRCk (i.e. the
model obtained byM by collapsing all the element with rank ≤ k to rank 0) satisfies
Ek: MRCk |=ALC+TR Ek. Also, as rank(B) = k and x ∈ T(B)
I , x must have
rank k in MRC , and rank 0 in MRCk (and, clearly, kM,rc(x) = k in M). Thus, x ∈
T(⊤)I , but also x ∈ (B ⊓ S˜)I , thereforeMRCk 6|=ALC+TR T(⊤) ⊓ S˜ ⊑ ¬B. Hence,
Ek 6|=ALC+TR T(⊤)⊓ S˜ ⊑ ¬B, i.e. S is a set of defeasible inclusions compatible with
B.
Furthermore, as x ∈ (¬D)I , Ek 6|=ALC+TR T(⊤) ⊓ S˜ ⊓ ¬D ⊑ ¬B, and hence,
Ek 6|=ALC+TR T(⊤) ⊓ S˜ ⊑ (¬B ⊔ D), i.e., T(B) ⊑ D does not follow from the
MP-closure of TBox.
To show that S is a maximal set of defeasible inclusions compatible with B, we
have still to show that S is maximal. Suppose, by contradiction, it is not. Then there is
a set S′ such that S′ ≺ S and Ek 6|=ALC+TR T(⊤) ⊓ S˜
′ ⊑ ¬B. Therefore, there must
be a ALC +TR modelN = 〈∆′, <′rc I
′〉 of Ek and an element y ∈ ∆′, having rank 0
in N such that: y ∈ (S˜′ ⊓B)I
′
.
As M is canonical, then MRC is canonical as well. Hence, there must be an ele-
ment z ∈ ∆ such that z ∈ (S˜′ ⊓B)I (the interpretation of all non-extended concepts in
z is the same as in y inN ). As y has rank 0 inN , y satisfies all the defeasible inclusions
inEk . Hence, the concept S˜′⊓B must have rank k in the rational closure and, therefore,
z must have rank k inMRC . Thus, z ∈ (T(⊤) ⊓ S˜′ ⊓ B)I inMRC , and z is as well
an element ofM satisfying S˜′ ⊓B.
Since S′ ≺ S there must be some h such that, Sh ⊂ S
′
h and, for all j > h, S
′
j = Sj .
Thus, there is some defeasible inclusion T(C′) ⊑ E′ ∈ S′ such that T(C′) ⊑ E′ 6∈ S.
so that z satisfies T(C′) ⊑ E′ (i.e., z ∈ (¬C′ ⊔ E′)I , while x violates it (i.e., x ∈
(C′ ⊓ ¬E′)I ). On the other hand, all the defeasible inclusion violated by z and not by
x cannot have rank ≥ h, as x satisfies only the inclusions S (by construction of S) and
S′ ≺ S. Therefore, z < y holds by condition (4), and y cannot be a typical B element,
thus contradicting the hypothesis. ⊓⊔
The converse of Proposition 2 does not hold, as the MP-closure is not complete
for minimal entailment in the S-enriched semantics. In fact, it may occur that, in some
minimal canonical S-enriched modelM, there are two concepts Cj and Ck, such that
kM(Cj) < kM(Ck) although in the rational closure rank(Cj) = rank(Ck). Consider
the following example.
Consider, for instance, the domain description of the baby penguin Example 3. In
any minimal canonical S-enriched model kM(BP ⊓ ¬Fly) < kM(BP ⊓ Fly). How-
ever, in the rational closure, rank(BP ⊓ ¬Fly) = rank(BP ⊓ Fly) = 2.
Hence, given the two additional defeasible inclusions d1 = T(BP ⊓ ¬Fly) ⊑ H
and d2 = T(BP⊓Fly) ⊑ ¬H , in the S-enriched semantics, by condition (4), we would
give a higher preference to d1 than to d2. This might cause additional conclusions in
the S-enriched semantics with respect to those we get from the rational closure.
Clearly, as the two concepts BP ⊓ ¬Fly and BP ⊓ Fly are disjoint, it is not the
case that a more specific concept which might inherit both d1 and d2 (with preference
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to d1), but a more complex counterexample to the completeness of MP-closure could
be built based on this idea.
5.1 Comparisons with the Lexicographic Closure and withDLN
While in the above examples the multipreference-closure gives the same result as lex-
icographic closure [33,12], this is not the case in general. Indeed, in the lexicographic
closure, when there are several defaults having the same “degree of seriousness” (the
same rank), a preference is given to situations that violate less defaults with respect
to situations violating more defaults, considering the cardinality of the sets of violated
defaults. In our construction, instead, we do not have a preference for accepting more
defaults rather than less, if they all have the same rank.
To show that in the MP-closure there is no preference for accepting two defeasible
inclusions rather than one (if they all have the same rank), let us consider the following
variant of Example 5.
Example 6. Let K=(TBox,ABox), where TBox = {Penguin ⊑ Bird, Penguin ⊑
((¬A ⊓¬H) ⊔ ¬B), A ⊑ C, T(Bird) ⊑ Fly, T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly, T(Bird) ⊑
H, T(Bird) ⊑ A, T(Bird) ⊑ B} and ABox=∅. There are two maximal sets of
defeasible inclusions compatible with the concept Penguin, namely:
S = {T(Bird) ⊑ H, T(Bird) ⊑ A, T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly} and
S′ = {T(Bird) ⊑ B, T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly},
The subsumptionT(Penguin) ⊑ C is not derivable from the MP-closure ofK as
E1 |= T(⊤) ⊓ S˜ ⊑ (¬ Penguin ⊔C), but
E1 6|= T(⊤) ⊓ S˜′ ⊑ (¬ Penguin⊔ C).
Differently from the lexicographic closure, the MP-closure (as the minimal canonical
S-enriched models semantics) does not consider S to be preferable to S′, although S
contains two defeasible inclusions of rank 0 while S′ only one (and both contain the
same number of inclusions of rank 1). 
To compare with the nonmonotonic logic DLN introduced in [3], let us now con-
sider the following reformulation of Example 5 in DLN . In particular, let KB =
(D,S), where:
D = {Bird ⊑n Fly, Penguin ⊑n ¬Fly, Bird ⊑n H, Bird ⊑n A} and
S = {Penguin ⊑ Bird, Penguin⊓ A ⊓H ⊑ ⊥, A ⊑ C, H ⊑ C}
(D are the defeasible inclusions and S the strict ones).
A consequence of a KB in DLN is that NPenguin ⊑ ⊥ (where NPenguin rep-
resents the prototypical penguin). In fact, while the default Bird ⊑n Fly is overridden
for normal penguins by the more specific defeasible inclusion Penguin ⊑n ¬Fly , the
defeasible inclusionsBird ⊑n H and Bird ⊑n A are not overridden by any other prop-
erties of normal penguins. and, as they cannot be both satisfied by normal penguins, the
conclusion is that there cannot be normal penguins at all (i.e. the prototype NPenguin
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is inconsistent), although there may be penguins. Clearly, in this case, anything can
be concluded about normal penguins (including NPenguin ⊑ C), and the approach
in [3] would require a repair the knowledge base by a knowledge engineer as there
are conflicting defeasible inclusions among which the conflict cannot be automatically
removed.
With the MP-closure we have to consider two alternative scenarios (the two maxi-
mal sets S and S′ of defeasible inclusions compatible with the conceptPenguin). As in
DLN , we cannot conclude that typical penguins areAs nor that typical penguins areBs.
However, as a difference with respect to DLN , we do not infer thatT(Penguin) ⊑ ⊥,
and we admit that there can be typical penguins. Furthermore, we conclude that they
are Cs (T(Penguin) ⊑ C).
Clearly, this comes at the price of considering all the maximal sets of defeasible in-
clusions compatible with Penguin (as in the lexicographic closure). A weaker andmore
skeptical variant of the MP-closure could be defined along the lines of [26], where an
alternative notion of closure, the skeptical closure, is proposed which is weaker than the
lexicographic closure and its computation does not require to generate all the alternative
maximally consistent bases. The construction in [26] is based on the idea of building a
single base, i.e. a single maximal consistent set of defeasible inclusions, starting with
the defeasible inclusions with highest rank and progressively adding less specific inclu-
sions, when consistent, but excluding the defeasible inclusions which produce a conflict
at a certain stage without considering all the alternative consistent bases.
6 Related Work
A lot of work has been done in order to extend the basic formalism of Description Log-
ics (DLs) with nonmonotonic reasoning features [36,1,15,16,20,23,29,7,5,11,34,31,30,10,3].
The purpose of these extensions is to allow reasoning about prototypical properties of
individuals or classes of individuals. A detailed descriptions of these formalisms and of
their relations to our approach based on the T operator, on preferential semantics and
on minimal models, may be found in [23,24]. Further recent approaches to defeasible
inference deal with low complexity description logics [4,22,6,2,25,35].
The interest of rational closure for DLs is that it provides a significant and reason-
able skeptical nonmonotonic inference mechanism, while keeping the same complexity
as the underlying logic. The first notion of rational closure for DLs was defined by
Casini and Straccia [11]. Their rational closure construction for ALC directly uses en-
tailment in ALC over a materialization of the KB. A variant of this notion of rational
closure has been studied in [10], and a semantic characterization for it has been pro-
posed. In [27,24] a notion of rational closure for the logic ALC has been proposed,
building on the notion of rational closure proposed by Lehmann and Magidor [32], to-
gether with a minimal model semantics characterization.
To overcome the limitations of rational closure, and, in particular, the fact that one
cannot separately reason property by property, the lexicographic closure has been intro-
duced for the description logic ALC by Casini and Straccia in [12], as a generalization
of the lexicographic construction by Lehmann [33]. A detailed comparison between the
present proposal and lexicographic closure has been presented in Section 5.1. To cope
with the limitations of rational closure, in [14,13] an approach based on the combination
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of rational closure and Defeasible Inheritance Networks has also been developed, and
in [9] a notion of relevant closure has been introduced, defining defeasibility in terms
of justifications.
In [3] a non monotonic description logics DLN has been proposed, which supports
normality concepts and enjoys good computational properties. In particular, DLN pre-
serves the tractability of low complexity DLs, including EL⊥
++
and DL-lite. The
logic incorporates a notion of overriding, namely the idea that more specific inclusions
override less specific ones. A difference with rational closure is that, in case there are
unresolved conflicts among defeasible inclusions with the same preference, in DLN
inheritance is not blocked and the conflict is made explicit through the inconsistency
of some normality concept. As we have seen, this logic also allows to separately rea-
son with different aspects and their inheritance through the overriding of conflicting
properties. A detailed comparison can be found in Section 5.1.
An approach related to our approach is given in [17], where an extension ofALC +
T with several typicality operators, each corresponding to a preference relation is pro-
posed. This approach is related to ours although different: the language in [17] allows
for several typicality operators whereas we only have a single typicality operator. The
focus of [17] is indeed different from ours, as it does not deal with rational closure,
whereas this is one of the main contributions of our paper.
Britz and Varzinczak in [8] deal with a notion of normality for roles by parameter-
izing preference order on binary relations in the domain of interpretation. They allow
the use of defeasible roles in complex concepts, as well as in defeasible (concept and
role) subsumptions, and in defeasible role assertions. The work in [8] extends the notion
of defeasible KB in another direction with respect to our proposal, by allowing multi-
ple preference relations (parametrized by roles) among pairs of individuals (rather than
among single individuals).
To conclude this section, let us observe that the S-enriched semantics introduced in
this paper is stronger than the Enriched semantics in [28], which allows for a weaker
condition than (4). Indeed, minimal entailment in [28] is stronger than entailment un-
der the rational closure, but weaker than minimal entailment under the S-enriched se-
mantics. In particular, in Example 3, minimal entailment in [28] does not allow the
conclusion that typical baby penguins do not fly.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced a multipreference semantics for the description logic
ALC which is a refinement of the semantics for rational closure proposed in [24], Be-
side a global preference relation, models are equipped with several preference relations
indexed with aspects. In this way, the multipreference semantics allows to reason about
the inheritance of different properties in an ontology in a separate way. We have intro-
duced a closure construction which is sound with respect to the multipreference seman-
tics, and we have established comparisons with the lexicographic closure and with the
logic DLN .
Verifying whether a query T(B) ⊑ D is derivable from the MP-closure of the
TBox in the worst case requires to consider an exponential number of sets of defeasible
19
inclusions. However, we expect that a weaker closure construction, which only requires
a polynomial number of entailment checks in the underlying description logic, can be
defined in the style of the skeptical construction in [26] mentioned above. This will be
the subject of future work.
Another subject for future work will be the investigation of a possible extension
of this semantics to more expressive description logics, for those cases in which the
rational closure can be consistently defined, as established in [19].
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